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THE CRIMINAL LAW AS A
THREAT SYSTEM
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Criminal laws prohibit some acts and try to deter from them by
conditional threats which specify the punishments of persons who were
not deterred. Sufficiently frequent imposition of these punishments by
courts of law makes the threats credible. If the community feels that
they are deserved, punishments also gratify its sense of justice, and help
to legitimize the threat system of the criminal law by stigmatizing crime
as morally odious.
The effectiveness of the criminal justice system depends not only on
its own practices, but also on independent social and psychological conditions which influence the legitimate and the criminal opportunities
open to individuals, their reactions to each, and their responsiveness to
the legal threats meant to deter them from crime. Opportunities vary
greatly from individual to individual and group to group; so do inclinations; and so does responsiveness to threats. Here, however, I shall treat
as variables only the practices of the criminal justice system, mainly the
punishments the law may threaten and impose.
In addition to deterring people from becoming offenders by making
the threats of the law credible, punishments may also restrain the actual
convicts. The death penalty does so altogether and permanently, while
punitive confinement reduces the time available to convicts for extramural offenses, and may rehabilitate some, so that after release they
commit fewer offenses than they might otherwise have committed.'
Let me assume finally that, in the instances with which I am concerned, the prohibitions of the criminal law are justified, and that the
moral or material cost of enforcing them by punishment need not be
* John M. Olin Professor of Jurisprudence and Public Policy, Fordham University; Ph.D.
New York University, 1952; M.A. State University of Iowa, 1942.
1 A high, although uncertain, proportion of habitual offenders is likely to resume criminal activities upon release, unless they are too old. A much smaller proportion of non-habitual offenders do so as well. Whether punishment reduces these proportions is not known.
Some convicts may make up for lost time.
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excessive. The questions to be addressed, then, are: What kind of legal
threats will deter crime most while least impairing justice according to
what is deserved? How can we determine what reduction of the crime
rate the community is willing to pay for, given the costs and benefits,
material and moral?
II.

Is

DETERRENCE REAL?

Since the threat system of the criminal law rests on the assumption
that deterrence is effective, a word about that notion may not be amiss.
General deterrence (heretofore and hereinafter referred to as "deterrence") is defined as the effect which threats of punishment, implemented by actual punishment of offenders, have in deterring non2
offenders from becoming offenders.
"Specific deterrence" is meant to produce lawabiding conduct of
confined convicts upon release, and, therefore, scarcely differs from rehabilitation. 3 Specific deterrence must be considered, however briefly,
because it is often confused with general deterrence and may discredit
the latter in the public mind: failures of specific deterrence, which are
indistinguishable from failures of rehabilitation, may be mistaken for
failures of general deterrence. Thus, recidivism, a failure of rehabilitation, is often described as a failure of deterrence, as though the fact that
repeaters seldom are rehabilitated demonstrates that threats do not deter non-offenders from becoming offenders. Even the mere occurence of
crime sometimes is thought to prove that deterrence "does not work."
Offenders are asked: "Were you deterred?" and when they answer "no"
(truthfully, for offenders were not deterred), their answer is taken to
show that deterrence fails. It failed with offenders, but it works, as intended, if it deters most people from becoming offenders. No threat can
deter all people all of the time; the attractiveness of crime to dissimilar
persons in dissimilar situations differs too much; so does their responsiveness to threats.
Deterrence is a matter of immediate observation (common sense),
which tells us that our behavior largely depends on the material and
2 For a concise summary of the literature on deterrence see F. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVENESS ON DETERRENCE (1971). For a more verbose discussion see F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS,
DETERRENCE (1973). For a discussion mainly of definitional and conceptual problems of
deterrence see J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE (1975). For an annotated
bibliography on deterrence up to 1977 see E. van den Haag, Annotated Bibliography on
Deterrence (1977). (available from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S.
Department of Justice.)
3 While the expected result is the same, "specific deterrence" is supposed to rely on intimidation or other disincentives while "rehabilitation" relies on the manipulation of positive
incentives. This distinction, of limited use to begin with, becomes blurred when processes
such as behavior modification are considered.
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psychological costs and benefits we expect from it, on the disincentives
and incentives we perceive. Deterrence theory maintains that
threatened punishment is a disincentive, or cost, to which most people
respond as they do to any disincentive: they try to avoid it. They violate the criminal law-which would not be needed if there were no
temptation to violate it--only if they feel that the benefits warrant the
risk of incurring the disincentive cost. Although estimates of costs, risks,
and benefits vary from person to person, they are not independent of
legal actualities.
Ever since Jeremy Bentham, psychologists have stressed that most
human actions are not preceeded by conscious and explicit calculations.
Indeed, habit influences most non-criminal as well as criminal behavior
more often than does conscious calculation. 4 But non-criminal habits
are formed, in part, by habituation to the threats of legal punishment
and by the conditioning that warns us to avoid it. It is impossible to
understand the survival of the human race without realizing that people
habitually tend to avoid or minimize natural and social dangers (costs)
in proportion to both the severity of the injury threatened and the risk of
actually suffering that injury. Given the attractiveness of a course of
action, people will follow it, or avoid it, according to the expected cost.
Legal dangers or costs-threatened punishments-in principle are
no less a deterrent than are natural dangers. Many readers of the present essay would refrain from reading it if the cost were a possible fine of
more than $100. 5 Nearly all readers would be deterred if credibly
threatened with imprisonment. If prospective readers can be deterred
from reading my work by the cost (risk of punishment), why should individuals not be deterred from other offenses in the same way?
Common sense does not prevent some social scientists6 from raising
doubts about deterrence. They point out that legal deterrence has not
4 See generally authorities cited supra note 2. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING
CRIMINALS 111-15 (1975). Note that fear of punishment does restrain animals such as rats
who presumably do not calculate. They can be conditioned by punishment in learning experiments. See, e.g., Singer, PchologicalStudies of Punishment, 58 CAUF. L. REV. 405, 413-14
(1970). Singer concludes that punishment can effectively suppress criminal behavior. Id at
442. See also Singer, PchologicalStudies Relevant to Deterrence, in CRIME DETERRENCE AND
OFFENDER CAREER (E. van den Haag & R. Martinson eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as CRIME
DETERRENCE].

5 The size of the fine required for deterrence depends, in part, on the likelihood of imposition, the attractiveness of the essay, the income of the person threatened, and his attachment

to money. It is possible to find sizes that will deter some, many, most, or (almost) all people.
6 Including psychologists and psychiatrists. See S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DiLEMMAS OF CRIME (1971); K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968); see also the
literature quoted in E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 4, at 105-37.

ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG

[Vol. 73

been demonstrated by methods regarded as scientifically satisfactory. 7
Others argue that it has not been shown that greater threats and more
frequent implementation have a greater deterrent effect than milder
threats, or threats carried out less often; still others argue that only the
frequency of implementation matters, or the perception of threats, or
the circumstances in which the people to be deterred live, such as their
social bonds, their motivations, their opportunities, or their role models-as though the fact that some factors impel to crime were inconsistent with the deterring effect of others.8 Empirical research certainly is
needed to quantify precisely the role each factor, or factor combination,
plays in determining the deterrent effectiveness of any threat. Nevertheless, the deterrent effectiveness of threatsperse can hardly be questioned:
our natural and social lives would be inconceivable without threats of
punishment (expectations of costs or dangers) and promises or reward.
Thus, incentives and disincentives are effective enough to shape the
course of most lives. 9 It is worthwhile to question (and to do research
on) the nutritional value of particular foods. But it is hardly worthwhile
to question the nutritional value of food in general. 10
III.

MANDATED, DETERMINATE, AND FLAT SENTENCES-

SWIFTLY IMPOSED

Celert' paribus, deterrence will be maximized if threatened punishments are predictable. The threat of an unpredictable punishment-for
example, probation or "up to three years in prison"-cannot deter as
much as the threat of a specific punishment: "three years in prison." A
price of anywhere up to $1000, decided upon after a purchase is made,
will not deter people from buying as readily as will a set price of no less
than $1000. As long as there is a good chance that the price will be less
than $1000 the person unwilling to spend $1000 may be willing to
purchase in the hope that the actual cost to him will turn out to be only,
say, $300 after all. To increase predictability and reduce the temptation
7 For a discussion of the evidence pro and con, see J. GIBBS, supra note 2; E. VAN DEN
HAAG supra note 4, at 133-42; E. ZIMRING, supra note 2.
8 Id
9 See ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (G. Becker & W. Landes

eds. 1974); see also M. Silver, A CriticalSurvey of the Recent Economic Literature on Deterrence, in
CRIME DETERRENCE, supra note 4. The psychological effects of punishment and the anticipation of punishment are examined by Barry F. Singer in PychologicalStudies of Punishment and
in PschologicalExperiments Relevant to Deterrence, both supra note 4.
10 But see H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 337-38 (2d ed.
1951): the "contention that punishment deters from crime [is futile] ....
The claim for
deterrence is belied by both history and logic." This view is echoed to this day. See, e.g.,
Wills, N.Y. Rev. Books, May 29, 1975, at 13 ("[P]risons . . . demonstrably do not deter.").
The widespread dismissal of deterrence in high school and college textbooks is described in
van den Haag, What Textbooks Say About Crimnbality, University Bookman, Fall 1980.
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to gamble, deterrence theory favors mandated punishments with little
discretion left to judges." Punishments thus become predictable
enough to be anticipated by those tempted to break the law. For the
same reason, deterrence theory favors both determinate sentences, which
confine for a set span of time (e.g., five years) rather than for an indeterminate span to be decided upon later (e.g., one to ten years), and flat
sentences, which are not reducible by parole boards or prison administrators. Currently, punishments are to a large extent discretionary (decided upon by courts within wide limits set by law), indeterminate (the
courts often merely set the minimum and maximum time to be served),
and expected to be reduced in various, often unpredictable, degrees by
outside boards and prison administrators (parole and time off for good
behavior). The proposed changes would minimize judicial discretion
and would eliminate indeterminateness, parole, and time off for good
behavior.' 2 These changes would lead to more equal justice as well as to
more deterrence. What objections might be raised?
One possible objection is that each crime is unique; so is each criminal. There are limitless individual differences in culpability, motivation,
harm done, and chances of recidivism. Further, the same punishment
may affect different convicts differently, depending on their ages, circumstances, and other individual characteristics. Finally, the effects of
the same crimes and punishments on third persons, such as victims and
dependents, are dissimilar. If one were to take full account of the uniqueness of each crime, or of each criminal, one could not have classificatory rules such as laws. Present policy compromises. It leaves wide
discretion to the criminal justice system, permitting individualization of
punishment but limiting it here and there through general rules. The
proposed mandated, determinate, and flat sentences would reduce discretion, and thus individualization, to a minimum for the sake of deterrence and of justice.
The deterrent effectiveness of any threat depends on perception of
its dimensions. Therefore, the more predictable the (non-trivial) size of
a legal punishment is, the more likely it is to deter. Consider natural
II

It was wrong, I believe, to disregard Aristotle's "laws. . . should. . . leave as little as
possible to the discretion of judges." ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 7 (1st Modern Library ed.
1954).
To be sure, deterrence might not suffer if courts had discretion to increase but not to
reduce threatened punishments. Such discretion, however, would still have some undesirable
effects. The idea of equality associated with justice and implicit in mandated punishments
would be weakened if punishments remain partially dependent on the discretion of judges
and thus disparate and capricious. Any increase in deterrence might be offset by the decrease
in perceived justice, and therewith, public support.
12 The elimination of time off for good behavior may make the maintenance of prison
discipline harder. Nevertheless, prison administrators retain many intramural rewards and
punishments for enforcing discipline.
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"law" (the regularities observed in nature). It inflicts predictable "punishment" (injury) on those who are not deterred from defying it by its
"threats" (known effects). Because the size of the punishment-be it
injury or death-is predictable, natural law deters most people from
jumping from the sixtieth floor of a skyscraper (unless bent on suicide),
and from the recklessness that may lead to drowning or other accidents.
Natural threats, as do legal ones, deter least when the threatened
punishment is delayed, cumulative, or unpredictable. Cigarette smoking and other habits, such as overeating, illustrate the reduced effectiveness of delayed "punishment." Finally, once a threatened activity has
become habitual, threats tend to be discounted altogether. Swiftness,
then, as well as predictability of punishment and of punishment size,
contributes to the deterrent effect of threats.13 Further, threats are likely
to be most effective with persons not yet habituated to the threatened
activity. Deterrence, as does any threat, influences habitformationfar more than
habits alreadyformed, criminal or other. Once deterrence has failed and
criminal habits have been formed, disincentives can affect only recidivism. 14 Strictly speaking, we are then dealing with rehabilitation rather
than deterrence.
The conditional threats of the law cannot be as automatically carried out as the conditional "threats" of the "law" of gravitation. Unlike
falling bodies, individuals who have defied the law must be apprehended, indicted, and convicted before they can be punished. There is
an irreducible element of uncertainty in implementing the threats of the
law-but no call for increasing it beyond necessity. Yet we do so if we
make the size of the punishment unpredictable. Mandated, determinate, and flat sentences would make the punishment more automatic
than it is now; and punishment is more deterrent the more automatic it
is. If the size of the "punishment" for jumping from a skyscraper were
as uncertain as the size of the punishment for a crime-if the "punishment" depended on the discretion of a court and of a parole boardmany more people would jump whenever something were to be gained
thereby.
IV.

OBJECTIONS

There are at least three major objections to mandated, determinate,
and flat sentences: (A) These sentences might be unjust by not taking
13 See supra note 2 for literature discussing the evidence for the effect of swiftness, certainty, and size. Note that as sentencing becomes quasi-automatic, much of the judicial time
thereby consumed could be saved.
14 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. On the effects of rehabilitation programs, see
D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1975) [hereinafter cited as D. LIPTON].
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the individuality of crimes and criminals into account. Offenses legally
classified as identical may deserve quite different punishments because
of unique features; only judges, having discretion, could determine what
is deserved. (B) Without sentencing discretion and without indeterminate sentences or parole, insufficient account might be taken of the prospects of each individual offender for rehabilitation. (C) Judges,
perceiving unique circumstances, would find ways to circumvent mandated sentences. Further, the abolition ofjudicial and parole discretion
would not decrease the discretionary power of the system but merely
relocate it: prosecutorial and police discretion would increase as judicial
discretion decreases. The first objection seems dubious, the second irrelevant, the third illogical.
A.

DISREGARD FOR INDIVIDUALITY IN SENTENCING

L

Injustice to individual oJnders

Would uniform sentences be unjust? Assume that A steals $500 to
clothe his needy children, B to buy liquor, and C to go to graduate
school. Is the proposition, "Theft of $500 is to be punished by X days
imprisonment, unless it be done to clothe one's children (in which case
there is a discount), or to attend graduate school (a smaller discount), or
to get drunk (a surcharge)," more just than the proposition, "Theft of
$500 is to be punished by X days in prison"? Should the absence of
needy relatives increase punishments? Should we leave it to each judge
to decide whether devotion to alcohol (a vice? or a disease?) is worse
than devotion to graduate study? Quite the same questions can be
raised with reference to situational factors, or character traits. Should
greed be less mitigating than jealousy? Should the customariness of unlawful behavior in a given environment be mitigating? Or should the
unusualness? Should the poverty, wealth, or age of the victim be a factor? (At present need or age of offenders is often considered.) More
generally what weight should be given to the harm done? It is easy to
think of illustrative cases. (1) Smith, while drunk, steals and flies a private plane. He collides with an airliner and kills fifty persons.
(2) Jones, equally drunk, does the same, but there is no collision.
(3) Frank steals the plan while sober, collides with another small plane,
and kills the other pilot while surviving himself. Obviously there are
many combinations of culpabilities and harms. It is not my purpose
here to suggest the appropriate punishments. But is there any reason to
believe that judicial discretion will lead to more just (or less unjust) results than mandated punishments based on broad classifications?
Even if all judges were of one mind in deciding which factors
should increase or decrease punishment, there would be disparate
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sentences for the same crime, since many different factor combinations
are involved in each crime, and each criminal is unique. Further, judges
too are unique individuals; therefore, they are not of one mind and will
evaluate similar factors differently. Even "identical" crimes do produce
disparate sentences. 1 5 To be sure, each person is unique and is placed
into unique situations; either of which may persuade him to criminal
conduct. But what enables any court to understand and evaluate the
unique personalities and life circumstances of offenders? And if understood, by what criteria are individuals to be judged in order to decide
what punishment is deserved? Can judges really take into account the
differences in heredity, environment, and opportunity which produce
different personalities? Can criminal justice take full account of the variety, can it correct the unfairness of life?
It is possible-it has been done-to work out a uniform and fairly
coherent set of punishments deserved for different crimes, or needed to
deter from them. But to decide what is justly deserved by different
criminals seems quite impossible for anyone but God. Our charitable
attempts to do justice to individuals must end in arbitrariness and injustice (as well as in reduced deterrence). Although crimes can be punished only by punishing criminals, it appears that we come nearest to
justice-and to equality-by punishing criminals according to their
crimes and not according to their personalities, circumstances, or motivations. Crimes should be legally classified according to their seriousness, and to the felt need to deter from them. Determinate punishment
for crimes, classified in this manner, should be mandated. The individual characteristics of criminals should be disregarded. The law should
confine itself to considering degrees of culpability, the previous convictions of criminals, and the seriousness of the crime. These matters can
be incorporated in the laws classifying crimes and mandating punishments; they do not require much discretion; nor do they individualize
punishments.
Mandated sentences would have an additional advantage. Since
discretionary sentences necessarily reflect the individuality of the judge
as much as that of the criminal, the offenders to whom we try to do
individual justice often will perceive the individualized sentences they
receive as unjust because they are necessarily chancy and unequal.
However guilty they may be, convicts may feel their sentences to be
undeserved if other convicts perceived as equally guilty, receive lesser
sentences. 1 6 Mandated sentences would preclude this grievance.
15 See W.

GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE:

A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING (1974).

16 For a discussion of the effects of unpredictability on convicts, see AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971).
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Equality does not assure justice--equal injustice is quite possible.
Inequality, however, necessarily implies some injustice. One, if not
both, of two unequal sentences must be unjust (and will be perceived as
unjust) if the crime was (or was perceived to be) the same. If one,punishment is just, any other punishment must be less than just, harsher or
milder than deserved; and if deterrence be the purpose, less or more
than optimally deterrent. Hence, equality is reasonably felt to be part
of justice in sentencing (and often is mistaken for the whole of it). Mandated punishments, which would be equal punishments, would
strengthen the sense of justice having been done. They also would do
away with the unresolvable issue of exemplary punishment-punishment that is harsher than customarily thought to be deserved and expected. Exemplary punishment is imposed to deter more than the usual
punishment does; by example, it becomes a threat to future offenders.
(Only threats deter, whether conveyed by words, or by example.) Yet
exemplary punishment, whatever its deterrent effect, is unavoidably
perceived as unjust, since it is not threatened before being imposed and
is harsher than (and thus not equal to) the punishment given previous
offenders. Exemplary punishment requires judicial discretion. If punishments were mandated they could be increased only by new laws; and,
unlike exemplary punishment, the new mandatory punishment would
be equal for all and threatened before it could be imposed. Hence the
problem of justifying unthreatened and unequal (exemplary) punishment would evaporate.
2

Justice to actualand to future victimzs

The law must do justice not only to offenders but also to actual and
potential victims of crime. Actual victims may reasonably contend that
the offender did not take their life-circumstances into account when victimizing them, wherefore they may feel that there is no moral obligation
to take into account his life-circumstances, or his individuality. 17 More
important, courts must also do justice to prospective potential victims of
offenders who could be deterred but are not because the punishment of
convicted offenders was individualized. Discretionary sentences thus
may be unjust to future victims by not deterring prospective offenders.
If we assume, arguendo, that mandatory, determinate, and flat sentences,
even though less just to current offenders, are more deterrent than discretionary sentences, then the mandatory sentences are more just than
discretionary sentences to prospective victims, since they deter addi17 Retributive justice is not meant merely to reflect the feelings of victims. Nevertheless,
legal retribution according to desert is an institutionalization of individual vengeance, and
cannot altogether disregard the feelings it institutionalizes.
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tional potential offenders from victimizing. After all, victimization is an
injustice to victims which, although not initiated by the courts, might be
prevented by them through deterrent sentences. And, if the victims of
future crimes are entitled to be protected against the injustice these
crimes would do them, their claim has greater weight than the current
offender's claim for protection against the possible injustice a mandated
sentence might do him. The current offender volunteered to take the
risk of punishment, including the risk of the possible "injustice" mandated punishments might do him. The prospective victim does not volunteer to be victimized. He cannot avoid the injury he suffers if future
offenders are not deterred for the sake of individualizing punishments of
current offenders.
3.

Identifiable and statisticalpersons

The injustice which the attempt to do justice to the individuality of
a current offender does to future victims is often overlooked because the
current offender is an identifiable individual who is tangibly present in
court and often pitiable. The victims of future offenses cannot be present. They cannot even be identified. They are "statistical persons,"
abstract and ghostly figures who do not invite our compassion and
scarcely appeal to our sense of justice. By nature and conditioning, we
tend to be impressed by identifiable persons and try to do justice to
them, often at the expense of anonymous statistical persons.18 Yet, although we are reluctant to acknowledge them and to pay heed to their
claims, statistical persons, at least our contemporaries in the same society, seem as entitled to justice as identifiable ones. 19 We can do justice
to them. The absence of future victims from the courtroom does not
invalidate their claim to protection from the injustice and injury of being victimized by criminals.

B.

DISREGARD FOR INDIVIDUAL PROSPECTS FOR REHABILITATION

I.

Discretionarysentencing and rehabilitation

Rehabilitation-the attempt to give incentives to an offender to be
lawabiding in the future-can scarcely be said to be a major function of
18 This tendency is not limited to the criminal justice system. We are more likely to spend
money for an identifiable person, actually sick, then for preventing the sickness of several
"statistical persons" by spending the same amount of money. We act similarly with respect to
poverty. I am grateful to Alan Wertheimer for drawing my attention once more to the distinction between identifiable and statistical persons, and to the terminology in which to discuss it. See Wertheimer, CriminalJusticeandPublicPoliq."StatisticalLives andPaisoners'Dilemmas,
33 RUTGERS L. REv. 730, 738-41 (1981).
19 Perhaps this is too strong. But surely statistical persons should not be ignored by justice, even if charity be biased in favor of identifiable ones.
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sentencing. Courts punish defendants because they are found guilty of
crimes committed in the past, whether or not they need rehabilitation.
Many do not. On the other hand, courts do not punish dangerous persons who have not yet committed crimes, however much they may be in
need of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is thus at best incidental to sentencing. Moreover, judges cannot determine what the chances for rehabilitation are except by means of the offender's record of arrests and
convictions, factors which mandatory, determinate, and flat sentences
20
readily could take into account.
Even if all, or a high proportion, of convicts were rehabilitated by
treatment in prison the crime rate would scarcely be reduced. The rehabilitated convicts would be replaced by new criminals, just as incapacitated criminals usually are. 2 1 In the long run crime rates (the supply of
crime) depend on the expected net benefit of crimes to perpetrators, not
on rehabilitation or on incapacitation of convicts. The crime rate can
be reduced only by deterrence. Therefore, the rehabilitation of individuals cannot be the social purpose of sentencing. On the other hand, justice must be done to individuals according to what is deserved by their
past crimes but not according to their future prospects. Rehabilitation,
however desirable, is thus incidental to either justice or deterrence, and
relevant to neither.
2. Parole and rehabilitation
Parole boards are presumed to be able to decide, on the basis of
interviews and reports about a convict's behavior in prison, whether the
convict has been sufficiently rehabilitated to be paroled. Since all other
relevant factors were available to the sentencing judge, this presumption
is the raison d'etre of parole boards. Yet, even if it were fully known,
behavior in prison does not tell much about conduct in a non-institu22
tional environment.
Even from an exclusively rehabilitative viewpoint punishment
20 Any statistical (non-individual) factor can be taken into account by the law without
requiring judicial discretion. On the other hand, the predictive relevance of ascertainable
individual character traits has not been shown. At present, the evidence indicates that rehabilitation (or recidivism) are best predicted by such factors as previous convictions, nature of
the crime, and age of the criminal. All these are available to the sentencing judge; they may
be taken account of in the mandated sentence to be imposed by him. The evidence also
indicates that recidivism and rehabilitation are not significantly related to programs offered
in prisons. For a discussion of on the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs see D. LIPTON,
supra note 14.
21 See van den Haag, Could Successful RehabilitationReduce the Crime Rate?, 73 J. GRIM. L. &
C. (forthcoming issue, 1982).
22 See N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 47 (1974). See alro J. CONRAD,
CRIME AND ITS CoRRECTION (1965); Conrad, PredictablePunishment, 16 J. CURRENT Soc.
ISSUES 64 (1979).
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should not depend on rehabilitation. Rehabilitative treatment tries to
lead the convict to choose legitimate over criminal activities upon release. This choice is likely to be based on his realization that criminal
activities are counterproductive, and this conclusion, if the convict
reaches it, is produced by the punishment which made the crime for
which he was convicted unrewarding or, at least, less rewarding. Rehabilitation is a learning process which, whatever the incentives to
lawabiding behavior, cannot be independent of punishment, a disincentive sufficient to make future crimes appear irrational to the convict.
Therefore, rehabilitation cannot be an alternative to the punishment on
which it depends. In practice, if the size of his punishment depends on
his apparent rehabilitation, the convict has more incentive to "fake it,"
and less to achieve it, than he has when his punishment is independent
23
of his rehabilitation.
3.

Additional argumentsfor parole

Once rehabilitation, the original reason for parole, became discredited in the face of overwhelming evidence of the ineffectiveness of rehabilitative programs and of predictions based on them, 24 alternative
justifications for parole were offered. These include the belief:
(a) that the parole commission may correct disparities in sentencing. Such disparities can, however, be readily avoided by mandatory
sentencing. Moreover, parole decisions introduce disparities of their
own;
(b) that parole may mitigate excessive sentences. Such sentences,
however, are best avoided on the judicial level by mandated sentencing;
(c) that parole permits gratification of the public desire for harsh
sentences while allowing them to be reduced quietly. 25 Thus, parole is
used to deceive the public in order to permit "experts" to impose the
reduced punishment they think sufficient whereas the public does not.
Parole as an institution cannot, however, be justified if its real purpose is
to deceive the public. The loud advertising of "heavy criminal sanctions" to be later reduced "quietly" by an elite of experts does amount
to deception. However objectionable, judicial discretion at least is displayed coram publico and lacks the element of deception.
23 See authorities cited supra note 22.
24 See Wilson, What Works? Revisited, PUB. INTEREST (Fall 1980).
25 Thus, Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 6 THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT
6, 14 (1976) argues that "a parole system allows us to advertise heavy criminal sanctions
loudly at the time of sentencing and later to reduce sentences quietly."
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CIRCUMVENTION OF MANDATED SENTENCING

1.

What discretion would be left to courts?

Laws mandating specific, determinate, and flat sentences could
leave some discretion to courts. Such laws might list aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, and indicate the extent to which each such
circumstance may modify the punishment. They might also deal with
general matters---e.g., they might allow probation for some categories of
misdemeanors committed by first offenders. Further, judges might have
discretion to vary mandated punishments by ten percent in either direction according to circumstances not specifically listed in the law. However, courts should be able to go beyond that variation only with a
written explanation. If they do, an appeal may reinstate the mandated
punishment.
Courts could not circumvent mandated sentences, if sentences can
be appealed by either side on the ground that they do not conform to a
legal mandate. Judges who, contrary to their sworn duty, deliberately
refuse to uphold the law, can be impeached.
2.

Prosecutorialdcretion

Prosecutorial discretion would remain exactly what it is now. The
absence or presence of judicial discretion, or of parole board discretion,
cannot by itself affect the discretion of prosecutors. Potentially, the discretion of other authorities may be a check on prosecutorial discretion,
but actually it merely adds to the discretion available in the system.
There is no evidence indicating that judicial- or parole-based discretion
reduces the ability of prosecutors to select charges or to accept plea bargains and, therefore, no evidence that the absence of judicial or parole
discretion would increase the discretion of prosecutors.
Prosecutorial discretion to bring charges and to accept plea bargains nonetheless should be limited as much as practicable. Probably
this can be done only by allowing victim representatives and others to
appeal to independent statewide boards against failure to bring charges,
26
or against the dropping of charges or acceptance of plea bargains.
V.

PUNISHMENT SIZES

If punishments are to be mandated, how are we to determine the
size appropriate for each crime?
26 Nobody likes plea bargaining since the result may be unjust to all parties. Yet it may
be indispensable as long as we insist on an excessively cumbersome legal system. See
Langbein, TortureandPleaBargaining,46 U. CHI L. REv. 3 (1978). For a full discussion, see 13
LAW & Soc'Y 2 (1979).
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Retributionist theory requires that, given culpability, punishment
be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime. That seriousness often
can be measured ordinally. Rape-murder is more serious than rape; assault with intent to kill more serious than without; recklessness more
serious than negligence. However, when crimes are heterogeneous it becomes harder to rank them according to degrees of seriousness. Is theft
more serious than fraud or simple assault? Worse, no cardinal measure of
seriousness is available. 2 7 Thus, when we can rank crimes by degrees of
seriousness, we cannot tell how much more serious a crime is compared to
a less serious one, and, therefore, how much more punishment it deserves, even if we can tell that it deserves more.
Imprisonment can be measured cardinally as well as ordinally (so
can fines); a term of eighteen months is not only more than one of twelve
months it is six months more. 28 But the cardinal measurement of punishment provides little help without cardinal measurement of the seriousness of crimes. From the viewpoint of just deserts, therefore, the
combination of crimes and punishments is, if not capricious, unavoidably arbitrary. We cannot show why burglary deserves a particular
punishment, and assault another, or why they both deserve the same.
This view-which goes back at least to G.F.W. Hegel-has been
challenged by Sellin and Wolfgang. 29 Responses to an ingenious questionnaire led them to conclude that people do regard one crime, such as
rape, not only as more serious than another, such as robbery, but also as
more serious by a definite quantity. By means of a point scale people
expressed how much more serious they felt rape is than robbery (205
points). Subsequent research by Stanley Turner 30 has indicated substantial agreement on the relative punishment deserved for each crime
in view of its seriousness (given the culpability of the criminal). Thus, a
cardinal as well as an ordinal scale can be constructed for the seriousness
of crimes and for the deserved punishments, as perceived by a sample
population.
Strict retributionists, although interested in these results, will not be
satisfied. Sellin and Wolfgang answered the questions: "How much
27 Ordinal measurement refers to less and more (bad and worse), cardinal measurement
to how much, and to how much less or more (how bad and how much worse).
28 Punishments must be distinguished from their effects. The effects are what the offender
actually suffers, and there is no way to measure them. The effects of one year imprisonment-the same punishment--differ, depending on the age, status, and, not least, character
of the imprisoned offenders. Note also that when punishments are not homogeneous they
cannot be cardinally compared to one another: fines may be less, and the death penalty more
harsh than imprisonment, but we cannot tell how much more or less.
29 J. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964).
30 See his reexamination of the Sellin-Wolfgang scale in the reprint of THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1973).
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more serious do people think rape is than robbery?" and "How much
more severe do they want the punishment to be?" Retributionists want
to know: "How much more serious a crime is rape than robbery?" and
"How much more severe does justice require the punishment to be?"
For the retributionist the moral question-what is justly deserved?cannot be answered by what people believe, although it is hard to see
how it can be answered once popular consensus is rejected as a basis for
decision.
Generally speaking, deontologists (and retributionists are deontologists) regard the question of punishment as a moral question and they
do not accept any popular view as decisive on moral questions. They
insist on an objective standard independent of subjective beliefs, although they have not found it. Now, what a majority believes to be
right or wrong is not necessarily what is right or wrong in any theory.
Our intuition sides with deontologists here. Surely, a person opposed to
abortion would not accept a popular vote in favor of abortion as moral
justification of it. Killing the members of a minority would not become
right, however much the majority favors it. So with degrees of punishment. But the objective standard deontologists seek is elusive.
In practice, what people believe to be just is likely to be accepted as
just even if the belief cannot be objectively justified. In turn, what people believe to be just is likely to be strongly influenced by tradition and
unlikely to differ greatly from the punishment required to deter from
crime to the degree desired by the community. That degree can be established by appropriate techniques and the Sellin-Wolfgang work is a
step toward establishing it.
If for the time being we accept deterrence as the purpose of punishment, and disregard retribution and its moral requirements, we can in
principle determine the punishment each offense calls for.3 ' Given the
culpability of the offender, 32 the correct punishment size is the size
which supplies the socially demanded degree of deterrence, which depends on the socially perceived harmfulness of the offense ("harmfulness" may include anything that makes deterrence desirable). The size
of punishments thus can be determined by two empirically measurable
quantities: the social demand for deterrence from each kind of crime,
and the supply of deterrence yielded by each size of punishment. In
turn, the social demand for deterrence can be quantified: ft is equal to
the frequency of any crime which society is willing to tolerate rather
than increase the size of punishment or other costs. ("Costs" here in31 See van den Haag, Punishment as a Devicefor Controllingthe Crime Rate, 33 RUTGERS L.
REV.706 (1981) for a discussion of this view.
32 Culpability ranges from neglect to premeditation, although the intervals are

indeterminate.
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clude moral and financial ones: anything that the community would
rather not do, unless it serves to avoid something thought worse.)
If we know these two quantities, which, in principle, are knowable,
we know the correct punishment for each crime. Admittedly the practical difficulties remain formidable. But deterrence theory can determine
correct punishment in principle.
Since they do not justify punishment by its consequences, retributionists cannot determine the size of punishments appropriate for each
crime by considering the consequences (deterrence) the punishment produces. Deterrence theory can, however, establish the appropriate punishment for each crime if the threat system of the criminal law is seen as
33
a device for reducing crime rates to socially acceptable levels.
From a retributionist view, punishment sizes must remain arbitrary. 34 Since consensus establishes only the social perception of desert,
without establishing desert, retributionist theory does require moreeven if it cannot supply it. Desert theory may, however, reach a consensus on punishment too, albeit by a different route. Indeed, the punishment sizes actually regarded by retributionists as deserved are quite
similar to those required by deterrence theory, for the actual retributionist consensus implicitly depends on the factors which deterrence theory
makes explicit. In practice, both the wickedness of crimes and what is
deserved for them are decided by popular feeling, which is influenced by
the perceived harmfulness of crimes, just as is the demand for deterrence. Further, the size of punishment retributionists think deserved for
any degree of wickedness is unlikely to be independent of its deterrent
effect. Retributionism thus tends to sneak in the deterrence elements,
which it is presumed to disregard, and to produce punishment sizes not
very different from those produced by deterrence theory. 35
33 Acceptance of intuitive justice requirements, such as punishment only of the guilty in
proportion to the perceived seriousness of their crimes, need not impair the effectiveness of the
device. See van den Haag, supra note 31, at 711-14.
34 This arbitrariness is the result, on the one hand, of abandoning the lex talionis which
made punishments less arbitrary, and, on the other hand, of abandoning a purely restitutive
penalization, which made punishments depend on market valuations of harm and/or on bargaining among the parties affected. Yet neither abandonment is avoidable from the retributionist point of view.
35 The convergence of deserved and deterrent punishment sizes tends to be overlooked by
philosophers hypnotized by individual cases which can be readily constructed to show that
deserved caQ differ from deterrent punishment sizes. Nonetheless, retributionists, inspired by
their intuition of justice, would not deal with crimes such as burglary, fraud, or assault by
punishments that diverge significantly from those necessary for deterrent purposes. If intentionality is held constant, divergency would be further reduced. The actual extent of divergences, however, remains unknown; nobody as yet has compared the punishment size for the
main categories of crime required by retributionist and by deterrence theory. For a different
view see Goldman, Bond the Deterrence Theor,: Comments on van den Haag's "Punishment as a
Device for Controling the Crime Rate", 33 RUTGERS L. RaV. 721 (1981).
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VI.

SUMMARY

In sketching the purpose and limitations of the criminal justice system (Section I) this essay tries to establish that the criminal law assumes
deterrence and that deterrence is effective even though rehabilitation
("specific deterrence") may not be (Section II).
Deterrence is found not to require conscious calculation by prospective offenders and to be maximized by mandated, determinate, and flat
sentences (Section III). These sentences are discussed and compared
with current practices. It is suggested that deterrence affects established
habits less than the formation of habits and depends on the threatened
punishment's being swift and predictable rather than cumulative,
delayed, and unpredictable. An attempt is made to show that the deterrent effect on non-trivial punishment increases with its predictability.
Objections to mandated, determinate, and flat sentences are considered (Section IV) in terms of individual justice and rehabilitative effectiveness. An attempt is made to show that such sentences may be less
unjust to individual offenders than is judicial and parole discretion. The
relative roles of justice, equality, and deterrence in criminal sentencing
are discussed. A distinction is drawn between justice to actual victims
and offenders and justice to future victims and offenders, to identifiable
and to "statistical" persons. It is suggested that future victims are insufficiently considered by discretionary practices and would be more properly considered by mandated, determinate, and flat sentences.
Rehabilitation is rejected as a reason for discretionary and indeterminate sentences and for parole. Additional arguments for parole are refuted. The discretion to be left to the courts is described, and it is
argued that courts could not easily circumvent mandated sentences and
that the latter would not increase prosecutorial discretion.
It is finally argued (Section V) that deterrence theory, in contrast to
retributionist theory, offers a non-arbitrary way of determining "correct" sentences for every crime in cardinal and ordinal terms. Deterrence theory is found to offer a basis for mandated, just, equal, and
optimally deterrent sentences.

